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NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND
WISCONSIN LAW: FERTILITY CLINICS
MAKING LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent custody dispute,1 a Tennessee circuit court was asked to
determine the disposition of seven cryogenically frozen embryos2 that were
the product of in vitro fertilization3 (IVF) undertaken by prospective par-
ents Mary Sue and Junior Davis.4 The circuit court decision, awarding sole
custody to Mary Sue for the purpose of implantation, was subsequently re-
versed on appeal and modified to an award of joint custody.5
Though somewhat inauspicious at first glance, the Davis decision is,
nonetheless, an important precursor of cases to come. It teaches us that
new legal relationships are born as a consequence of creating life ex-
tracorporeally. Davis is particularly significant not for its result, but for the
fact that it focuses attention on the reproductive continuum. It is a poign-
ant reminder that the concept of viability, as the measuring line for protect-
ing prenatal rights, is slowly but steadily eroding in today's legal system.6
Lawmakers must now contemplate whether the conceptual line should be
1. Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989).
2. Id at 2098. Cryogenic preservation is a procedure whereby cells are subjected to freezing
in a laboratory and thawed through a step by step procedure for later use. Liquid nitrogen is
generally used as the freezing agent. Id.
3. Id In vitro fertilization (IVF) is the procedure whereby the ovum and the sperm are
placed in a petri dish in a special medium, and fertilization occurs. Id.
4. Id. at 2097.
5. Davis v. Davis, No. 180 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (LEXIS, States Library, Tenn.
file). By the time the Davis appeal was heard, Mary Sue and Junior were remarried and neither
wanted a child with the other as parent. On appeal, Mary Sue was seeking the authority to donate
the embryos to a childless couple. The court held that, consistent with the viability approach in
the abortion context, the circuit court was in error by granting the embryos a legal status
equivalent to that of a person. Further, the court concluded that, absent pregnancy, neither party
should be burdened with unwanted parenthood. To compel parenthood was held to be an imper-
missible infringement on procreative freedom. Custody was awarded jointly to the Davises, until
such time as they could agree on what to do with their embryos. Id. at *3.
6. The viability concept set forth in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was criticized by
Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opinion in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983). Justices White and Rehnquist joined by O'Connor observed:
The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with itself. As the medical risks
of various abortion procedures decrease, the point at which the State may regulate for
reasons of maternal health is moved further forward to actual childbirth. As medical sci-
ence becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point of
viability is moved further back toward conception .... The Court adheres to the Roe
framework because the doctrine of stare decisis demands respect in society governed by the
rule of law.... Although we must be mindful of the "desirability of continuity of decision
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pushed back, one step further. A myriad of legal rights is at stake. Is it
possible to grant legal rights to the preimplantation embryos which will not
infringe on the biological parents' right of procreation? If human embryos
are granted legal personhood, what standards for awarding custody should
prevail? Should frozen embryos be available for adoption, and if so, must
fertility clinics and hospitals be subject to current adoption regulations?
Will embryos thawed long after a testator's death be permitted to inherit?
Although the Davis7 court was faced only with the question of custody,
Judge W. Dale Young, presiding as trier of fact, ultimately decided that the
IVF embryos were human life which deserved the status of legal per-
sonhood.8 It is telling that he looked to what he perceived as the absence of
in constitutional questions ... when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt
constrained to follow precedent."
Id. at 458.
For a complete discussion on the underpinnings of Roe, see generally discussion and sources
cited infra note 97.
Viability as the measuring line for protecting prenatal rights is evolving in the areas of criminal
and tort law as well. Several states have revised their homicide statutes to include feticide; many
protect the fetus from the moment of conception. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38., paras. 9-1.2, 9-2.1,
& 9-3.2 (Smith-Hurd 1991) (defining "unborn child" as "any individual of the human species
from fertilization until birth"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1989) (defining murder as "the
wrongful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought"). Other states that have
enacted specific feticide statutes include: Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Burns 1989);
Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 609.2661-.2665 (1989);
Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.210 (1988); New York, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney
1988).
Twelve states presently allow recovery to a child born for injuries sustained in utero, any time
after conception. These states include: Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michi-
gan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas.
As early as 1977, in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977),
the Supreme Court of Illinois held that an infant could maintain an action against a hospital and
physician for any injuries sustained as a result of negligent transfusion of blood to the mother.
This is a remarkable result in view of the fact that the transfusion occurred several years prior to
the infant's conception. Id. at 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
7. 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2097.
8. Id at 2099 nn.13-16. In arriving at its decision, the trial court weighed the testimony of
four experts: Dr. King, a medical doctor and specialist in the field of infertility/reproductive endo-
crinology; Dr. Shivers, an embryologist; Dr. Lejeune, a medical doctor and a specialist in the field
of human genetics; and, John A. Robertson, professor of law, author of numerous scholarly trea-
tises on various medical-legal subjects including IVF and cryopreservation. Id
Each of these experts offered opinions as to when human life begins. King, Shivers, and Rob-
ertson agreed that the cell differentiation present in the preimplantation embryo was not suffi-
ciently developed to constitute human life. Id. By contrast, Lejeune testified that "[w]hen the first
cell exists, all the 'tricks of the trade' to build itself into an individual already exist.., when the
ovum is fertilized by the sperm, the result is 'the most specialized cell under the sun.. . .' and,'[a]s
soon as he has been conceived, a man is a man.'" Id. at 2100. The court was persuaded by
Lejeune's testimony that the individual's genetic make-up, as evidenced by a deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) test, is complete at the embryonic stage. Id. at 2102.
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controlling state law and common law in arriving at his decision.9 In so
doing, Judge Young implicitly rejected Roe and its progeny as controlling
in the context of IVF. 10
Even though the circuit court decision was subsequently reversed by the
Tennessee Court of Appeals," it nonetheless serves to remind that IVF
technology demands nothing less than a comprehensive state policy that
addresses the consequences of new reproductive technology. Current fed-
eral and state law primarily address the question of fetal research, and only
mention IVF procedure tangentially. 2 Thus, even as the demand for IVF
and related technology increases, only one state has attempted to clarify the
full spectrum of legal relationships which arise between the genetic parents,
the embryo, and the clinic.' 3 In the absence of state law, important public
policy will be left to the determination of the courts, or to the clinics them-
selves. Arguably, neither the participants in the new reproductive technol-
ogy nor the public at large is benefitted by ad hoc administration.
Wisconsin is among those states which offer fertility clinics,' 4 but have
no laws which define and delineate the legal rights of the participants. 5
With no controlling statutory law, present IVF policy in Wisconsin is left to
9. Id. at 2103. The court looked to the Tennessee Wrongful Death Statute and the Tennessee
Criminal Abortion Statute but found neither established a public policy with regard to the rights
of a human embryo, in vitro, in a divorce case. Id.
10. Id. Addressing whether any precedent controlled in this area, the court observed "that
both Roe and Webster dealt with questions of the constitutionality of abortion statutes and the
Court's decisions in those cases have a profound effect on the states' compelling interest in the
protection of human life, but only as it deals with the abortion issue." (citations omitted). Id.
11. Davis, No. 180 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (LEXIS, States Library, Tenn. file) at *1.
12. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(c) (1985) regulates fetal research and specifically defines a fetus as the
product of conception following implantation; pregnancy is similarly defined as starting post-
implantation.
13. Louisiana has enacted a comprehensive law which includes thirteen subsections. LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-133 (West 1989).
For data on declining birth rate, increase in the infertility rate, and the declining availability of
healthy infants, see Marcia J. Wurmbrand, Note, Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social and Legal Impli-
cations, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1079 (1986).
14. Interview with Cindy Gunnarson, RN, Clinical Services Coordinator for the Advanced
Institute of Fertility (AIOF), associated with Waukesha Memorial Hospital and Sinai-Samaritan
Medical Center (Feb. 11, 1991) [hereinafter Gunnarson].
Ms. Gunnarson indicated that IVF clinics began operating in Wisconsin in 1983. The first
clinic was associated with the University Medical Center in Madison, under the direction of Dr.
Shapiro. Now, three additional clinics service Wisconsin: the AIOF (with offices at Waukesha
Memorial and Sinai-Samaritan) under the direction of Dr. K. Paul Katayama, and a clinic in
Appleton, Wisconsin. A fifth center may open shortly under the direction of Dr. Charles Koh.
Id.
15. A thorough search through the index to the Wisconsin Statues revealed no law on either
fetal research or IVF procedure. This was confirmed by Ms. Gunnarson. Id.
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the clinics, which operate pursuant to American Fertility Society (AFS)
guidelines.16
This Comment will assess the impact of IVF and related technology on
Wisconsin custody, adoption, and inheritance law. The analysis will en-
compass a two-prong approach: An evaluation of current Wisconsin law
and its underlying presumptions and an evaluation of the policies presently
imposed by Wisconsin fertility clinics on their clients. The statutory laws of
other jurisdictions will be considered, as well as pertinent case law, in order
to suggest that the unregulated status quo deserves legislative consideration.
Before proceeding further, a brief overview of IVF and cryopreservation is
provided for background.
II. NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
AND CRYOPRESERVATION
In vitro fertilization (IVF) 17 is one of many elective procedures used
today to treat infertility.18 It is unique insofar as it is the only infertility
procedure that involves the extracorporeal union of the ova and the sperm.
IVF is most often elected by couples to overcome the man's low sperm
16. Because there is no statutory law on point, the inference is logically sound that the con-
sent forms provided by the infertility clinics to their patients are the only guidelines available to
participants. Ms. Gunnarson stated that the consent forms presently in use, drafted by a local law
firm, follow AFS policy guidelines. See Gunnarson, supra note 14.
17. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
18. See John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure
of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939, 947 (1986). Other infertility treatments include
microsurgery to repair fallopian tubes, artificial insemination, and fertility drugs used to stimulate
ovarian follicular development. Id.
In addition to IVF, the AIOF also offers the following procedures: gamete intrafallopian trans-
fer (GIFr); zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT); and partial zona dissection (PZD). See Gun-
narson, supra note 14. The GIFT procedure is similar to IVF insofar as eggs are removed from the
female client. However, instead of placing the eggs in a petri dish for fertilization to occur, the egg
and sperm are injected directly into the fallopian tube using a special syringe. Fertilization occurs
in utero. See RICARDO H. ASCH & SERONO SYMPOSIA, GAMETE INTRA-FALLOPIAN TRANSFER 7
(1990) (pamphlet available at AIOF) [hereinafter Asch].
In the ZIFT procedure, eggs are fertilized in vitro and the embryo is transferred to the fallo-
pian tube. See Sinai-Samaritan Medical Center, The Advanced Institute of Fertility, MILWAUKEE
HEALTH, at 2 (1990) (quarterly brochure available at Sinai-Samaritan).
PZD is a technique used to cause a small rupture to either the egg or the embryo depending on
the particular infertility problem. If the problem is sperm motility, PZD is used to create a tiny
hole on the surface of the egg to allow sperm to penetrate. If, on the other hand, previous at-
tempts at IVF implantation have been unsuccessful, PZD may be used to create a tiny gap on the
surface of the embryo to facilitate adhesion to the uterine wall post-implantation. This procedure
is also known as "assisted hatching". See AIOF, CONSENT FOR PARTIAL ZONA DISSECTION OF
EMBRYO, and CONSENT FOR MICROMANIPULATION BY PARTIAL ZONA DISSECTION, at 1 (1990)
(consent forms available at AIOF). See also Joe Manning, Local Baby is First in Midwest Born
After Shell-Cutting Method, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, June 16, 1990, at 1.
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count or poor sperm motility, or to bypass the woman's blocked or dam-
aged fallopian tubes.19 The first successful live birth occurred in England in
1978.20 Since then, more than 5,000 births have been reported worldwide.21
Success rates for the procedure vary. Some clinics report a twenty to
twenty-five percent chance of pregnancy following the uterine implant, with
two-thirds of those implants resulting in live births.22
The IVF technique consists of four steps: (1) development of ovarian
follicles (sac containing the eggs); (2) collection of the oocytes (eggs); (3)
fertilization of the egg and growth of the embryo; and (4) replacement of
the embryo to the uterus.23
At the first stage, female candidates are given either a drug or a hor-
mone to stimulate ovarian follicular development. Client-patients are coun-
seled on the effects of the drugs they may choose: clomid is selected by
participants who prefer to stimulate fewer eggs (two to four); and pergonal
is selected by participants who wish to ensure a greater number of eggs.
With the latter choice, the intent is to store some eggs for future implanta-
tion attempts.24 Shortly before ovulation, another hormonal drug is given
by injection to maximize egg maturation.25
Collecting the eggs is the most complex aspect of IVF. If a laparoscopy
is performed, a light general anesthesia is administered. During the proce-
dure, the eggs are aspirated from the follicular shell through an incision
beneath the navel.26 An alternative to the laparoscopic procedure is ultra-
19. See Robertson, supra note 18, at 947.
20. Clifford Grobstein, Coming To Terms With Test-Tube Babies, in TAKING SIDES, CLASH-
ING VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL BIOETHICAL ISSUES 25 (Carol Levine ed., 1989).
21. See Mark Curriden, Joint Custody of the Frozen Seven, 76 A.B.A. J. 36 (1990). The author
of this article states that 5,000 births have occurred since 1978. However, since he fails to cite to
any authority, I include a citation to Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy.
L. REV. 357, 365 (1986). Andrews states that as of 1986, 3,000 births occurred. This figure is cited
to reports presented at the Fourth World Conference on In Vitro Fertilization, held in Melbourne,
Australia. Id. at n.43.
22. Reported success rates for the IVF procedure are dependent upon the screening proce-
dure and policies of a given clinic. Clinics which operate a fulltime patient practice may have a
higher success rate (up to 50%). See Gunnarson, supra note 14. See also Wurmbrand, supra note
13, at 1083 n.25.
23. See RICHARD P. MARRS & SERONO SYMPOSIA, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO
REPLACEMENT 3 (1990) (pamphlet available at AIOF) [hereinafter Marrs].
24. AIOF offers both clomid and pergonal to its clients. Clomid is ingested in pill form and is
most often used to stimulate ovulation in women who have infrequent periods and long cycles.
Pergonal (HMG, human menopausal gonadotropin) is administered by injection. Spouses can be
taught to administer the injections if the couple is willing. See THE AMERICAN FERTILITY SOCI-
ETY, OVULATION DRUGS, A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 8-13 (1990) (pamphlet available at any Wis-
consin fertility clinic).
25. See Robertson, supra note 18, at 948.
26. See MARRS, supra note 23, at 6.
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sound-directed needle aspiration. This technique is less intrusive because
aspiration occurs vaginally, rather than through an incision, and requires
only a local anesthetic.27
Once the eggs are retrieved, they are placed with the sperm in a petri
dish, where they will be left alone to fertilize for approximately forty
hours.28 If fertilization occurs normally, the female candidate will return to
the clinic within one to three days for implantation of the embryos in her
uterus.29 The procedure for implantation is simple and requires no anes-
thetic. A catheter is inserted into the uterus through the cervix and the
embryos are transferred into the uterine cavity.3"
Among the variables in IVF procedure is the number of eggs initially
aspirated. Some clinics will not aspirate more eggs than they would need to
implant, thereby avoiding the dilemma posed by disposal of unused em-
bryos.31 Other clinics leave this choice to their clients; excess eggs, once
fertilized, may be frozen for later use.32 Generally, however, no more than
four embryos are transferred to the womb to avoid the risk of multiple
births.33
27. Id. See also Robertson, supra note 18, at 948 n.26. It is interesting to note that in 1986, at
the time Robertson published his seminal work on IVF procedure, only one program in the
United States used the ultrasound guided needle method to aspirate eggs. Robertson notes that in
1986, ultrasound was a less effective method for retrieving eggs. Id. Six years later, ultrasound
has virtually replaced laparoscopic procedure, largely because it requires no surgical incision, no
general anesthetic, it involves less discomfort to the patient, and is as effective in retrieving eggs.
AIOF uses ultrasound almost exclusively. See Gunnarson, supra note 14.
28. See MARRS, supra note 23, at 7. The sperm and egg are first visually examined approxi-
mately eighteen hours after insemination. Id.
29. MARRS, supra note 23 at 7.
30. Id. at 6.
31. See Robertson, supra note 18, at 948 n.29.
32. AIOF offers its client-patients either the IVF procedure alone or IVF in conjunction with
cryopreservation. If the client prefers only IVF, between two to four eggs are aspirated and fertil-
ized; if IFV and cryo are preferred, all eggs found in the uterus will be aspirated and fertilized;
then two to four embryos will be implanted and the remainder will be frozen for future implanta-
tion attempts. See Gunnarson, supra note 14.
In addition, AIOF follows a strict policy that no eggs or embryos will be destroyed. All
participants must sign a variety of consent forms relinquishing their right to their genetic material;
the clinic bears the self-imposed responsibility of finding donee recipients. Id.
33. Multiple births are an accepted risk of the IVF procedure. The AIOF uses a standard
consent form to inform its patients of the risk. The form is entitled "Number of Embryos to be
Transferred" and it contains the following statistical information: per 3 embryo transplant, 31%
of patients achieve pregnancy, and 10% of those are multiple pregnancies; per 4 or more embryo
transplant, 39% achieve pregnancy, and 28% of those are multiple pregnancies. Below these
statistics, there is a signature line for husband and wife. Id. (consent form available at AIOF).
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Cryopreservation is the process of freezing the fertilized embryos in liq-
uid nitrogen.34 Experts in reproductive endocrinology disagree as to how
long embryos may be safely stored. The American Fertility Society (AFS)
presently recommends storage up to four years.35
There are several advantages to using the cryogenic procedure. IVF is
physically demanding on the woman, as well as time consuming and costly.
The injections, tests, and preparatory steps that precede implantation may
result in the retrieval of as many as eight to twelve eggs. Electing to fertil-
ize and freeze the surplus avoids repeating the discomfort, time, and cost
involved in IVF.3 6 The client pays a one time charge to cryopreserve the
embryos.37 In addition, cryopreservation enables some patients to have a
better chance of achieving pregnancy because the ovarian stimulants are no
longer present in the patient's bloodstream.38
With the advent of IVF and other advanced medical techniques, ninety
percent of all infertile couples can conceive and bear biological offspring.
Women who are without ovaries or fallopian tubes are today bearing chil-
dren. Likewise, men who have had a vasectomy or who are paralyzed are
fathering children.39
In addition to reducing the problem of infertility, reproductive choice is
also exponentially increased by IVF technology. 4 Women could elect IVF
34. See Wurmbrand, supra note 13, at 1083. The form presently in use explains cry-
opreservation to clients in the following manner: "[O]nce fertilization has taken place and the
embryo has reached the appropriate state of cell development, it is transferred to a controlled
biologic freezer capable of cooling accurately to subzero temperatures and maintaining the frozen
embryos at a constant temperature thereafter." Id.
35. Dr. King, testifying at the Davis trial, estimated safe storage up to two years. See supra
note 8, at 2099 n.13. By contrast, Gunnarson, AIOF Clinical Services Coordinator, stated that
there was no maximum amount of time that she was aware of, but that the AIOF followed the
four year limit set forth in AFS guidelines. See Gunnarson, supra note 14.
36. See Robertson, supra note 18, at 949. Robertson's assessment that the patient-client is
generally benefitted by full scale retrieval followed by fertilization and cryopreservation is sup-
ported by a cost analysis for IVF procedure today in Wisconsin. The preparatory work-up, lab
fees, medications, retrieval and costs for the implantation procedure are generally $5,000. A sub-
stantial number of patients do not achieve pregnancy after one implantation attempt. The cost for
cryopreservation at AIOF is $860 and this includes one year of storage. See Gunnarson, supra
note 14.
37. See Gunnarson, supra note 14.
38. Cryopreservation allows for delayed embryo transplant. The delay enables the embryo to
be transferred under more natural conditions and is believed to be more conducive to implanta-
tion. See AIOF, CONSENT FOR CRYOPRESERVATION 3 (1990) (consent form available from
AIOF).
39. See Sinai-Samaritan, supra note 18, at 1.
40. See generally Robertson, supra note 18, at 954-57. The thrust of Robertson's article is
that although laws are necessary to clarify the legal framework for the new reproductive technolo-
gies, they must, by necessity, be limited. In most instances, the "interests of embryos, offspring,
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to ensure later-life pregnancies by aspirating eggs in their twenties when egg
production is higher. IVF could also be elected prior to known radiation
treatments that could cause genetic damage to the ovaries.4 1
The options available through IVF and related technology compel soci-
ety to reevaluate the role of the family and the roles men and women tradi-
tionally play in the reproductive scheme. Many, however, are not prepared
to accept these changes. They are against the procedure because they be-
lieve the sanctity of reproduction should remain in the womb.42 Some be-
lieve that creating life in vitro dehumanizes and denigrates the miracle of
birth.43 The infertile couple and the clinics offering these techniques may
counter with a right of privacy argument, grounded upon prior Supreme
Court decisions which firmly establish the constitutional right to procreate,
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion.'
Thus far, access to IVF has been upheld by the courts.45 It is ethically
condoned in fifteen countries.46 Cryopreservation, however, enjoys no such
consensus.47 The most divisive issues focus on disturbing visions of genetic
engineering and a general concern for the safety and efficacy of the proce-
dure with respect to the potential damage freezing and thawing may do to
the unborn life.4" To date, however, the incidence of genetically damaged
the family, and others" do not justify interference with the individual's right to reproductive
choice. Id. at 1040.
41. See Wurmbrand, supra note 13, at 1084.
42. See Elisa K. Poole, Allocation of Decision-Making Rights to Frozen "Embryos, 4 AM. J.
FAM. L. 67, 69 (1990). Members of Right-to-Life and the Catholic Church have spoken out
against IVF and cryopreservation. See Bruss, infra note 152.
43. See generally Hans 0. Tiefel, Human In Vitro Fertilization: A Conservative View, in TAK-
ING SIDES, CLASHING VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL BIOETHICAL IssuES 21 (Carol Levine ed.,
1989). Hans 0. Tiefel, professor of religion argues: "No one has the moral right to endanger a
child while there is yet the option of whether the child shall come into existence." Id. Tiefel also
asserts that risk to the unborn is "the crucial and decisive ethical argument against the clinical use
of in vitro fertilization... that also makes this procedure unnatural." Id.
44. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). "If the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
Id. at 453 (citation omitted).
45. Few challenges have actually been brought. However, recently an Illinois statute on fetal
research was struck down on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague and because it
infringed on a woman's right of privacy. See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill.
1990). The Illinois statute purported to prohibit "nontherapeutic" and "experimental research"
on fetuses, while specifically permitting IVF. Id. at 1363.
46. See Carol Levine, Postscript: Is it Wrong to Create Test-Tube Babies?, in TAKING SIDES,
CLASHING VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL BIOETHICAL ISSUES 31 (Carol Levine ed., 1989).
47. Id.
48. See generally Tiefel, supra note 43, at 22-23.
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children from either IVF or cryopreservation is no higher than the statisti-
cal ratio found among womb-fertilized births.49
Although the benefits of IVF are apparent to some, and experts admit
the medical risks are uncertain, all participants share a common risk in that
their legal relations to one another are ill-defined or virtually unspecified by
statutory law. Most programs today follow AFS guidelines and proceed on
a contractual basis. The most far-sighted contracts admit to the present
uncertainties in the law and specify that any provision held to be unenforce-
able is severable from the remainder of the contract.5' The client couple
seeking to enter a fertility program is required to sign a variety of consent
forms which typically contain the following provisions:
Developing laws may require changes in some of the Program's poli-
cies, procedures and requirements, and we agree to be bound by any
such changes. We understand that the legal uncertainties include,
but are not limited to, the following:
(a) inheritance rights of embryos;
(b) legality of embryo donation and applicability of laws gov-
erning termination 6f parental rights and adoption;
(c) extent to which one spouse may exercise dominion and con-
trol over embryos without consent of the other spouse;
(d) the extent to which a court, in an action for divorce, might
refuse to enforce the provision ... for release upon divorce
and might award custody of embryos to one spouse, holding
the other spouse liable for child support in the event that the
embryos are transferred and pregnancy occurs. 1
It is no accident that the attorneys who drafted this consent form ad-
dress the legal uncertainties in the area of custody, adoption, and inheri-
tance law. The language is taken from forms presently used by the
Advanced Institute of Fertility (AIOF) in Wisconsin. Wisconsin presently
permits clinics to set their own policies and guidelines. Participants pro-
ceed at their own risk. Whether and to what extent fertility clinics should
set important social policy is discussed in the following sections.
49. See AIOF, CONSENT FOR IVF 1 (Sept. 1989) (consent form available at AIOF). Client-
patients sign a consent which states the following: "We understand that the risks to the embryo
associated with human embryo freezing, thawing and transfer are not well established at present.
However, in the limited number of birth [sic] from frozen human embryos, no substantial increase
of developmental defects has been reported." Id.
50. See generally AIOF, CONSENT FOR IVF, at 2.
51. Id. at 2-3.
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III. REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: CUSTODY, ADOPTION, AND
INHERITANCE LAW
A. IVF and Cryopreservation Available in Wisconsin Today
The first fertility clinic to offer IVF in Wisconsin began in 1983 at the
University Medical Hospital in Madison. 2 Today, four clinics provide
both IVF and cryopreservation as well as other treatments including GIFT,
ZIFT, and PZD.5 3
Wisconsin's first birth through the implantation of a frozen embryo oc-
curred in March 1988 through the efforts of Dr. K. Paul Katayama, direc-
tor of the Advanced Institute of Fertility (AIOF). 4 The AIOF program
began in 1984 and has since resulted in more than 250 births using IVF
procedures."5 Success rates at the Institute are high; approximately thirty
percent of the couples treated will have a baby per single egg retrieval cy-
cle.56 The institute serves hundreds of couples each year, but limits its serv-
ices to those who are married.
The marriage requirement is only one of several policies that Wisconsin
clinics have established which have no support in law.58 The central policy
which forms the basis for the clinics, is that once an embryo is successfully
fertilized (or an egg is successfully retrieved) it shall not be destroyed. 9 To
that end, clients must consent to relinquish custody of their embryos to the
clinic for the purpose of donation and transplant to a donee client, selected
52. See Gunnarson, supra note 14.
53. See Robertson, supra note 18.
54. Joe Manning, First Frozen Embryo Pregnancy in State Delights Bay Mother-to-Be, MIL-
WAUKEE SENTINEL, Mar. 1, 1988, at Al.
55. See Sinai-Samaritan, supra note 18, at 2.
56. Id.
57. See Gunnarson, supra note 14. In the interview with Ms. Gunnarson, she was unable to
report an exact number of clients who are treated at the AIOF annually; however, she was certain
the aggregate amount was greater than 200.
AIOF's policy of requiring client-patients to be married corresponds to American Fertility
Society (AFS) guidelines. The preamble to the policy statement published by the AIOF states:
The In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) Program is an approved member of the In Vitro Fertiliza-
tion Special Interest Group of the American Fertility Society (AFS). To achieve this sta-
tus, the Program demonstrated compliance with AFS criteria. To maintain the approved
status of the Program, the policies set forth below are adopted.... The IVF Program...
will accept only married couples.
Id. (policy statement available at AIOF).
58. See generally Robertson, supra note 18, at 962-64, for a complete discussion on the rights
of unmarried persons to elect alternative reproductive technologies including IVF and artificial
insemination.
59. See supra note 57. The AIOF policy statement declares: "[C]lear documentation of the
number of fertilized ova and their use by the physician(s) involved, in a writted [sic] or dictated
note is required. No fertilized ova will be destroyed." Id.
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by the clinic. The consent forms in use today require the embryos to be
automatically released to the clinic under the following circumstances: (1)
during marriage, if after the passage of four years the couple has not re-
quested embryo transplant to the wife, and the couple has not requested an
extension of the four year period;' or (2) upon divorce (the couple must
agree that neither will seek custody of their embryo);6' or (3) in the event
that the wife undergoes a hysterectomy or otherwise becomes incapable of
accepting transfer; 62 or (4) in the event that either spouse dies (within the
four year period) the embryo will remain with the survivor until the four
year period lapses;63 or (5) in the event that both spouses die.' The policy
requires that embryo donation will be a completely anonymous procedure,
wholly within the control of the clinic. The identity of the genetic parents
remains confidential. The genetic parents relinquish their right to select a
donee; they are not informed of the transfer, nor do they learn the identity
of the donees selected.65
There are several legal questions which arise as a consequence of this
policy. The first is whether and to what extent the clinic may compel ge-
netic parents to relinquish their genetic material. Under the aforemen-
tioned provisos, death, divorce, or incapacity result in automatic
termination of parental rights. These provisions could be unenforceable,
however, because they infringe on the fundamental right of procreative free-
dom.66 The second legal question concerns the absolute anonymity provi-
sion of donation. Current Wisconsin law permits biological parents to
participate in the selection of the future home of children they wish to sur-
render and provides for a hearing to terminate parental rights. 67 Arguably,
the same right, should be extended to the genetic parents of an IVF embryo.
60. See AIOF, CONSENT FOR CRYOPRESERVATION 3 (1990) (consent form available at
AIOF).




65. Id. at 5. The consent form requires that if the embryos are released under any of the
provisions contained therein (divorce, death, incapacity), the physician may transfer them to do-
nees "without any further authorization by or notice to us. We shall have no right to be informed
of transfer, no right to learn the identity of any Embryo Donees, and no right to participate in the
process of selecting Embryo Donees." Id.
66. See generally Andrews, supra note 21, at 358-66. Andrews argues that the only protec-
tions which may be extended to embryos are those that do not infringe upon the procreative
autonomy of the parents. Banning experimentation with embryos or allowing suits on their behalf
against third party tortfeasors would be permissible. Id. at 364.
67. WIs. STAT. § 48.837 (1981) (Independent Adoption).
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Bearing in mind the terms under which patrons to Wisconsin fertility
clinics participate, the following sections will examine the policy considera-
tions which underlie state custody, adoption, and inheritance law. The ex-
tent to which clinic procedure is inconsistent with the policy of current
statutory law will also be addressed.
B. Custody Law
On May 3, 1988, new laws relating to child custody determinations were
enacted by the Wisconsin Legislature.68 The public policy which emerged
as a result of these enactments may be gleaned from the directive which
guided the special committee toward their study of, among other things: (1)
existing laws relating to child custody determinations in actions affecting
the family and the limitations of those laws; (2) ways to encourage shared
parenting options, including imposing joint custody without the agreement
of both parties; and (3) ways to provide support services to families involved
in custody matters to ensure that the best interest of the child continues to
be served after a child's parents become divorced or separated. 9
Paramount to this legislative inquiry was the underlying belief that
shared-parenting promotes the best interests of the child. To that end, the
committee recommended separating the legal authority to make major deci-
sions concerning the child (legal custody) from the question of with whom
the child would reside (physical placement).70 Significantly, an award of
"sole legal custody" will not necessarily preclude shared "physical
placement. '71
In addition, Wisconsin Statutes section 767.24 further mandates a
number of significant factors that the court must follow or consider in any
custody award. Especially important are: (1) gender and race may not be a
factor in determining a custody award;72 (2) the court's decision must in-
68. See Wisconsin Legislative Council Information Memorandum, New Law Relating To
Child Custody Determinations In Actions Affecting The Family, at 1 (1987-88).
69. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (West 1987-88: Highlights of 1987 Act 355). Act 355 revised
laws relating to child custody determinations in actions affecting the family (divorce, annulment,
legal separation, and paternity). Comment to Act 355 explains the legislative directive to the
special committee and states the committee's findings.
70. See Patricia L. Grove, Child Custody Standards: Practical Primer For The General Litiga-
tor, 10 Wis. J. FAM. L. 11 (1990).
71. Id. at 12. Grove observes that due to the flexibility of joint custody provisions, few cases
are not resolved by some form of joint custody. Sole legal custody has become the exception. It
will only be granted if the conditions precedent for an award of joint legal custody are not met.
72. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(5) (1987-88). This section provides: "The court may not prefer one
potential custodian over the other on the basis of the sex or race of the custodian." Id.
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corporate the "best interest" factors set forth in the statute;73 (3) the child is
entitled to periods of "physical placement" with both parents unless it may
endanger the child's emotional, mental or physical well-being;74 and (4) the
court may not base its decision of "physical placement" on a parent's fail-
ure to meet child support payments.7"
Implicitly this mandate requires the court to balance the needs of the
child with the rights of the parents, underscored by the value judgment that
two parents are better than one.76 To some extent, it presupposes the abil-
ity of post-divorce parents to set aside their differences in order to mutually
cooperate in the ongoing process of parenting. 7
73. Id. The "best interest" factors are set forth in subsections (a)-(k).
The court shall consider the following factors in making its determination:
(a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.
(b) The wishes of the child, which may be communicated by the child or
through the child's guardian ad litem or other appropriate professional.
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or
parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interest.
(d) The child's adjustment to the home, school, religion and community.
(e) The mental and physical health of the parties, the minor children and other
persons living in a proposed custodial household.
(f) The availability of public or private child care services.
(g) Whether one party is likely to unreasonably interfere with the child's
continuing relationship with the other party.
(h) Whether there is evidence that a party engaged in abuse of the child, as
defined in s. 48.981(1)(a) (b) or 813.122(1)(a).
(i) Whether there is evidence of interspousal battery as described under s.
940.19 or domestic abuse as defined in s. 813.12(l)(a).
(j) Whether either party has or had a significant problem with alcohol or drug
abuse.
(k) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be
relevant.
Id
74. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(4)(b) (1987-88). This section provides: "A child is entitled to periods
of physical placement with both parents unless, after a hearing, the court finds that physical place-
ment with a parent would endanger the child's physical, mental or emotional health." Id.
75. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(4)(c) (1987-88). This section provides: "No court may deny periods
of physical placement for failure to meet, or grant periods of physical placement for meeting, any
financial obligations to the child or the former spouse." Id.
76. See supra note 69. The special committee found existing laws on custody arrangements
did not adequately stress " the significance to the child, in most cases, of a continuing meaningful
relationship with both parents." Id.
77. See generally Grove, supra note 70, at 11.
Optimally, it envisions that parents will be able to set aside personal differences and work
together regarding the parenting of their children following a divorce. Without exception,
researchers have found that the key variable affecting the satisfactory adjustment of chil-
dren following a divorce is the extent of continuity of both parents' involvement in child
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In addition to the shared-parenting presumption embodied in the Wis-
consin law, the statute presupposes the live birth of a child who is at some
stage of minority, and whose parents each request custody for themselves.7"
There is no reason to doubt that custody disputes over frozen embryos
could not arise under these circumstances. Many of the "best interest" fac-
tors listed in subsections (a) through (k)7 9 would be as appropriate in the
IVF context as they are under traditional circumstances. The concept of
shared-parenting would likewise be applicable and valid.
In order to render the statute applicable to IVF embryo, Wisconsin
would need only to draft a custody statute specifically addressed to the situ-
ation. The statute should direct the court to apply the relevant "best inter-
est" factors set forth in section 767.24. Custody arrangements per se do not
constitute an impermissible infringement on the genetic parents' right to
procreative liberty in situations where both parents request the opportunity
to bring the embryo to term.8"
In the context of IVF, custody arrangements are left to the discretion of
the clinics which perform the procedure.8 " The genetic parents are required
to give their written consent not to seek an award of custody in the event of
divorce.2 This provision, not yet tested in the courts, would not likely
withstand a constitutional challenge grounded on the right of reproductive
autonomy. 83 Moreover, it is inconsistent with the traditional belief that the
biological parents are the preferred caretakers, unless it can be shown that
they endanger the child mentally, physically, or emotionally. 4 De facto
regulation by fertility clinics raises a more serious question as well: Do we
want private or quasi-public organizations formulating social policy for the
state?
rearing. See J. Wallerstein and S. Blakeslee, Second Choices: Men, Women & Children A
Decade After Divorce: Who Wins, Who Loses--And Why (1989).
Id
78. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(1) (1987-88).
79. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
80. Reproductive autonomy is not at issue in the instance where both genetic parents want
their embryo to be implanted. Under those circumstances, the issue of custody should be guided
by the "best interest" factors set forth in Wis. STAT. § 767.24(5) (1987-88).
81. Couples entering the AIOF program are required to sign consent forms donating their
embryo to the clinic in the event of death, divorce, incapacity or failure to request implantation
within the 4 year time limit. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
82. See AIOF, supra note 60, at 4.
83. See Andrews, supra note 21.
84. See Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 348 N.W.2d 479 (1984). In Barstad, the court
held that in a custody dispute between a parent and a third party, unless the court finds that the
parent is unfit or unable to care for the child, or that there are compelling reasons for denying
custody to the parent, the court must grant custody to the parent. Id.
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The Davis case is illustrative of the constitutionally problematic custody
issue which may arise in the context of IVF-the right of one genetic parent
to veto implantation altogether.85 In Davis,86 the circuit court held the fro-
zen embryos were not property, but human life in its earliest stage of devel-
opment.87 Sole custody was awarded to Mary Sue because she expressed to
the court her desire to implant the embryos.88 Junior Davis preferred "de-
stroying the embryos, or, as a last resort giving them to an anonymous third
party. He was even willing to pay to keep them frozen forever."89 Judge
Young found Mary Sue's desire to bring the embryos to term more conso-
nant with his ruling that the embryos were life, and as such, deserved the
State's protection. Young, applying the "best interest" standard to the em-
bryos, held that it serves the best interests of the child or children, in vitro,
for their mother, Mrs. Davis, to be permitted the opportunity to bring them
to term through implantation."90
On appeal, Junior Davis objected to any future implantation by Mary
Sue on the grounds that it forced unwanted parenthood upon him.91 The
Tennessee Court of Appeals agreed with Junior Davis and observed:
Awarding the fertilized ova to Mary Sue for implantation against
Junior's will, in our view, constitutes impermissible state action in
violation of Junior's constitutionally protected right not to beget a
child where no pregnancy has taken place. We have carefully ana-
lyzed Tennessee's legislative Acts and case decisions and conclude
that there is no compelling state interest to justify our ordering im-
plantation against the will of either party.92
The appellate decision explicitly drew a parallel between U.S. Supreme
Court decisions on abortion and unwanted parenthood in the context of
frozen embryos.93 Yet, it is arguable that the rights involved are not paral-
lel at all. In the abortion context, once a pregnancy is in progress, state
interference with the freedom of the mother to continue the pregnancy is
limited. By contrast, IVF presents a circumstance where the genetic par-
85. In the first Davis trial, Junior Davis sought to prevent Mary Sue from future implantation
attempts with their embryos. In a sense, he claimed that to permit her to become a parent against
his will, was akin to genetic rape. For a discussion on the equal right to veto implantation, see
generally Poole, supra note 42.
86. Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989).
87. Id. at 2099.
88. Id. at 2104.
89. Mark Curriden, Frozen Embryos: The New Frontier, 75 A.B.A. J. 68, 68 (Aug. 1989).
90. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. at 2098.
91. Davis v. Davis, No. 180 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (LEXIS, States Library, Tenn.
File) at *4.
92. Id. at *5-*6.
93. Id. at *6.
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ents are equal donors of their genetic material.94 The IVF context requires
balancing the burdens of unwanted parenthood with the right of the other
genetic parent to procreate when no pregnancy has occurred, and to some
extent, requires considering the right of the frozen embryo to be born.9"
In reversing the circuit court decision, the Tennessee appellate court
prioritized the fundamental rights of the parties. The right to control one's
own genetic material, which implicitly derives from the right to procreate,
was held to supersede the right of the other genetic parent to procreate and
the right of the embryo to life.9 6 Until the Supreme Court speaks more
directly to this issue, the appellate court's reasoning is tenable, but not
absolute. 9
7
Moreover, under certain circumstances, the right to veto implantation
might be unreasonable. Consider the situation where the frozen embryo
represents one genetic parent's only opportunity to beget his or her own
biological offspring. One legal scholar suggests that the power to veto
should depend upon the equities of each case. Under this view, the genetic
parent's interest in bearing a child with whom he or she shares a genetic
link would presumably, in some circumstances, outweigh the burdens of
unwanted parenthood.98
94. Although men and women each contribute their genetic material for IVF, the woman's
donation is arguably somewhat greater insofar as she is subjected to injections, pills, and the
retrieval procedure in order to effectuate her donation. In absolute terms, however, the donors are
considered to be equal to one another; no parallel can be drawn to the abortion context after a
pregnancy is in progress.
95. Professor Robertson argues that the preimplantation embryo cannot be accorded the sta-
tus of "personhood" because it is, in fact, less than a human life. Therefore, the embryos have no
rights which may be balanced in the equation. See Robertson, supra note 18, at 968-70. This was
also the gist of the testimony Professor Robertson gave at the Davis trial. See supra note 1, at
2100.
96. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
97. See Poole, supra note 42, at 75. Poole suggests the preimplantation embryo may be pro-
tected in light of Webster.
Arguably, the rights and interests at stake in the abortion context are not precisely the same as
those which are at stake in IVF, thus, the viability concept in abortion may not necessarily control
in IVF. Moreover, a state could conceivably protect IVF embryos should the Supreme Court
abandon "viability." See generally Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping
Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639 (1986). Rhoden suggests that the underpinnings of Roe have
eroded because the medical technology available in 1973 is outdated; thus, although the Court
must reconsider the position it took in Roe, law "should not be controlled by science. For while
science seeks to be value-free, law is ultimately the articulation of social values. The judicial
process cannot become value-free and remain judicial." Id.
98. See Poole, supra note 42, at 86. John A. Robertson, professor of law at the University of
Texas, Austin, and member of the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, was an
expert witness at the Davis trial. Professor Robertson has written the seminal legal treatise in the
area of IVF. See generally Robertson, supra note 18.
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The allocation of rights between the genetic parents themselves and be-
tween the genetic parents and the embryo is difficult to resolve because IVF
places the parties in a new relationship to one another. Although this sug-
gests that no hard and fast rules should control, legislation could be enacted
to clarify the legal relations of all participants. In addition, to the extent
that the circumstances of a custody dispute parallel those which arise as a
result of coital reproduction, and both parents request custody of their em-
bryos, the "best interest" factors may be applied as easily to in vitro chil-
dren as they apply to children in utero. It is difficult to imagine how the
absence of law is beneficial to any of the parties involved.
C. Adoption Law
Independent adoption allows biological parents to directly place their
children in the home of a non-relative. It became a reality in Wisconsin in
1981 and was codified under Wisconsin Statutes section 48.837. The statute
sets forth the mandatory requirements for the petition and procedure which
the biological and the adoptive parents must follow if they elect to pursue
this form of adoption.99 The statute exists side by side with a traditional
adoption statute, but is more inclusive because it encompasses children who
are not yet born. °o°
By statutory mandate, the petition submitted for independent adoption
must include the names of all relevant parties as well as any intermediary
person or agency "which solicited, negotiated or arranged the placement of
the child with the proposed adoptive parents." 10 1 No adoption under this
statute is anonymous. In instances where the adoption is arranged prior to
the birth of the child, hearings on the termination of parental rights and
approval of the adoptive parents are postponed until the child is in being. 102
Under the Wisconsin scheme, the child's best interests are protected in
two ways: A guardian ad litem (GAL) is appointed to represent the
child, 03 and the child welfare agency is directed to prepare an investigative
99. Wis. STAT. § 48.837 (1981). The statute requires that the parents and the adoptive family
submit a joint petition alleging among other things, "the name, address and age of the child or the
expected birth date of the child." Id.
100. Id
101. Wis. STAT. § 48.837(d) (1981).
102. Wis. STAT. § 48.837(4)(a) (1981). This section provides: "Notwithstanding [sec.]
48.422(1), [the court] shall schedule a hearing within 60 days of the date of filing, except that the
hearing may not be held before the birth of the child."
103. Wis. STAT. § 48.837(4)(b) (1981). This section provides that the court "[s]hall appoint
counsel or guardians ad litem when required under [sec.] 48.23."
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report for the court."° Because of the finality of the decision, the rights and
interests of the biological parents and the adoptive parents are best pro-
tected by independent counsel.105
At the first hearing, the court considers the recommendations of both
the GAL and the welfare agency. A subsequent hearing is held to termi-
nate parental rights if the court determines from the reports that placement
in the adoptive home is in the best interests of the child. 6
The underlying purpose of independent adoption is to offer biological
parents a legal means through which they can meaningfully participate in
the process of placing their child up for adoption." 7 The detail and speci-
ficity of the statute ensures that the state will not abdicate its role as parens
patriae 10
8
The independent adoption statute is reflective of a rivalry between two
schools of thought: those who believe private and public agencies are best
equipped to be the intermediary in adoption, and those who would argue
that restricting the process to agency adoption is an impermissible infringe-
ment on a parental right of choice.109 The Wisconsin statute no doubt also
reflects a growing concern that parents have to secretly place their children
up for adoption, despite a lack of statutory authority to do so.110 At the
very least, the law is a compromise reflecting parental rights on one hand
and the public policy concerning the welfare of minors on the other.11
Although it would not be possible for the parents of a frozen embryo to
secretly place their embryo up for adoption,1 2 most of the public policy
104. Wis. STAT. § 48.837(4)(c) (1981). This section provides that the court "[s]hall order the
department or county department... to investigate the proposed adoption placement, to inter-
view the petitioner, to provide counseling if requested and to report its recommendation to the
court at least 5 days before the hearing on the petition."
105. See Judith S. Newton, Independent Adoption in Wisconsin, 5 Wis. J. FAM. L. 72 (March
1986).
106. Wis. STAT. § 48.837(6) (1981). This section explains the order of the hearings for termi-
nating parental rights and adoptive placement.
107. See Lucy Cooper & Patricia Nelson, Adoption and Termination Proceedings In Wiscon-
sin: A Reply Proposing Limiting Judicial Discretion, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 650 n.61 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Cooper].
108. See Newton, supra note 105, at 72; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed
1990): "'Parens patriae,' literally 'parent of the country' refers traditionally to [the] role of state
as sovereign and guardians of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles ... 
109. See Cooper, supra note 107, at 650 n.61.
110. Id.
111. See Newton, supra note 105, at 72.
112. This assertion is one of logical inference-the biologic freezer used by infertility clinics
to cryopreserve could not be replaced by a mere household freezer. However, it is interesting to
note that in York v. Jones, No. 89-373-N (E.D. Va. 1989), when the court ordered the clinic to
turn the Yorks' frozen embryo over to the couple, the clinic packed the embryos in a "biologic dry
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concerns present with in utero adoption apply to in vitro adoption as well.
Adoption is very much an issue in the context of an IVF embryo because
clinics are apt to aspirate, fertilize, and store more embryos than are imme-
diately used for implantation.' 13 In cases where the initial or subsequent
implants achieve pregnancy, a surplus of embryos will often result.I 4 Sur-
plus may also occur if the couple gets divorced and no longer desires to
implant the stored embryo, if both genetic parents die, or if one or both of
the genetic parents become incapacitated."' Another situation that would
result in surplus could arise if a woman elects to donate ova." 6 Whether
infertility clinics would be permitted to fertilize anonymous ova and sperm
in the first instance will depend upon restrictions imposed by the state. 17
Consent forms presently in use, issued pursuant to AFS guidelines, permit
client-patients to donate their genetic material.I 8
"Donation," rather than "adoption," is a term of art in the infertility
vernacular.' 9 Client-patients sign a variety of consent forms relinquishing
their right to either the ovum or the embryo prior to IVF or IVF followed
by cryopreservation. The consent form signed by the donee couple contains
a telling warning:
We understand that there are also some legal risks in our participa-
tion in the program as donees, due to the lack of laws or judicial
decisions dealing with the legal status of frozen embryos, oocyte do-
nors and oocyte donees. We realize that some of our understandings
and intentions, as set forth herein, may, at some future time, be held
to have no legal effect.' 2
Clinics are clearly aware that the legality of oocyte (egg) donation and the
applicability of laws concerning termination of parental rights and adoption
present a legal risk to patients. The risk will persist until either the court
considers the enforceability of these consent forms, or the legislature acts to
shipper" to enable the Yorks to take them as carry-on luggage on their plane trip to California.
See Lori B. Andrews, Birth of a Motion, STUDENT LAW., April 1990, at 30; see also infra note
143.
113. See Gunnarson, supra note 14.
114. Id.
115. See AIOF, supra note 60, at 3-5.
116. See Robertson, supra note 18, at 961 n.68.
117. Id. Robertson suggests that "laws that limit noncoital reproductive options are of
doubtful constitutionality, and may be struck down if challenged." Id. at 961 n.68.
118. See AIOF, CONSENT FORM FOR CRYOPRESERVATION, supra note 34, at 3-5.
119. Perhaps infertility clinics avoid the term "adoption" because it implies a legal procedure
that is absent in the transfer of parenthood which clinics promote under the guise of "donation."
120. See AIOF, CONSENT By APPLICANTS FOR DONATED OocYTEs 2 (1989) (consent form
available at AIOF).
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clarify the legal relations of all participants.121 Meanwhile, unlike adoption
of children in utero, consenting donors terminate their parental rights to the
embryo without a hearing. 22 In addition, unlike Wisconsin's independent
adoption statute which removes anonymity from the process, anonymity is
required by the clinic. 23 The donor parents of fertilized embryos and the
donor of oocytes must agree to relinquish any right to be informed of fertili-
zation, implantation, or to participate in the process of selecting donees. 124
The transfer of parenthood from donors to donees under AFS consent
forms is similar to the provisions for paternity under Wisconsin's artificial
insemination statute. 2 Attorneys for the clinic in Wisconsin did not fail to
notice the parallel. The following provision is found in oocyte consent
forms for donors and donees used by the AIOF:
We have been informed that Wisconsin law declares the consenting
husband of an artificially inseminated woman to be the father of the
child, and declares that the sperm donor shall have no parental
rights, and it is our expectation and hope that a similar law may
develop to govern the legal status of donors and donees of
embryos.1 26
In a sense, the consent forms themselves bear the most persuasive argu-
ment for state action. Implicit in the various risks signaled is a myriad of
unexpected and unwanted repercussions which may ensue in a court of law.
The potential disruption to the lives of two sets of parents and the IVF
offspring, which could result from a successful challenge, would not be in
the best interest of any of the participants. Moreover, public policy is fur-
thered when the legal interests of the parties are made more certain. Pres-
ent law seeks to ensure that the child is placed in a stable environment,
where continuity of relationships is the norm. Protecting the future of the
in vitro child is no less compelling; protection will benefit the child and
further public policy interests as well.
121. Although Wisconsin courts to date have heard no cases in this area, litigation has oc-
curred in Virginia, New York, Illinois, California, and Tennessee. See supra note 5; see infra notes
141-47 and accompanying text.
122. The AIOF, Consent By Applicants For Donated Cocytes provides: "The legal risks for us
include... the legality of oocyte donation and applicability of laws governing termination of
parental rights and adoption." See supra note 120, at 3.
123. See AIOF, CONSENT FORM FOR CRYOPRESERVATION, supra note 34, at 5.
124. Id.
125. Wisconsin's artificial insemination statute provides: "the husband of the mother at the
time of conception of the child shall be the natural father of a child conceived." See Wis. STAT.
§ 891.41(1) (1979).
126. See supra note 120, at 10; AIOF, CONSENT FOR OOCYTE DONATION 2 (1989) (consent




Only under the law of property are the rights of the unborn presump-
tively valid. Early common law, generally codified by most states today,
provided that a child in gestation at the death of the intestate was deemed
to be in being, and might inherit a share equal to that of the class to which
it was a member, if born alive. 127 Under modern statutes, the right to prop-
erty accrues at the moment of conception and vests upon birth.128 Granting
legal rights to posthumous heirs conceived in utero places little if any bur-
den on estates, because the gestational cycle of nine months is sufficiently
short and not overly disruptive to the administration of estates.
Public policy, favoring swift and efficient probate, however, may be se-
verely tested with the advent of cryogenically preserved embryos. 129 Be-
cause the right to inherit is statutory, the rights of a thawed Wisconsin
embryo will depend upon the wording of the posthumous heir statute.
Present law provides that "a person may be an heir.., even though born
after the death of the decedent if that person was conceived before the dece-
dent's death."' 0 Absent a qualification that the unborn be in utero prior to
the intestate's death, the present law could be construed to allow children
born years after an ancestor's death to claim against the estate. 13 1
Although one could argue, citing legislative intent, that it is unlikely that
any court would so interpret the statute, the mere possibility should suffice
to remind lawmakers that they ought to review this law.
Unlike the right of procreation, there is no fundamental right to inherit.
Should the legislature elect to limit the rights of frozen embryos by impos-
ing a limit to the time allowed for claims against an estate, it could do so,
and likely withstand an equal protection challenge. Treating a class of fro-
zen embryos differently from embryos in utero would be acceptable if the
classification were reasonable and not arbitrary, and if it rested upon some
difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the purpose of the
legislation. 132 The need for finality in probate within a reasonably fixed
period of time would certainly justify the imposition of a time limit. More-
127. SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 283-84
(1987).
128. Wis. STAT. § 852.03(4) (1973) (posthumous heir statute).
129. See supra note 14.
130. Wis. STAT. § 852.03(4) (1973).
131. See Andrews, supra note 21, at 393. Andrews contrasts the usual posthumous heir stat-
ute with Louisiana probate law, which requires the embryo to be "in utero" at the time of the
testator's death in order to inherit. Id at 393-94.
132. See George P. Smith III & Roberta Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and the New Biology, 67
MARQ. L. REV. 263, 277 (1984) [hereinafter Smith].
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over, legislators could empower the courts to impose a trust on the property
for the benefit of the frozen heirs for a reasonable period of time, after
which, if no live birth occurred, the property would devolve through intes-
tate succession. By contrast, it is unlikely that a statute designed specifi-
cally to deny the right to inherit to frozen embryos, born alive within a
reasonable period of time, would survive an equal protection challenge. In
addition, such a law may be vulnerable on due process grounds.1 33
Until such time as legislation is enacted, only the private contractual
agreements between the clinic and its client-patients address the uncertainty
of inheritance rights of embryos.1 34 A donee couple who receives an oocyte
or a fertilized embryo ready for implantation must agree that their prospec-
tive child is only entitled to inherit through them, and has no such rights to
inherit from the donors.1 3' This provision parallels the presumptions en-
forced under adoption statutes following the hearing for termination of pa-
rental rights.136
Donor parents face the same legal uncertainty. The risks are well illus-
trated by the language of the consent form:
[W]e understand that this release may or may not have an effect on
the issue of the embryos' inheritance rights. If we have other chil-
dren and have wills that make provision for our "children", it is
possible that the term could be interpreted to include our embryos.
If we die intestate (without wills), it is possible that our embryos
could be held to be our "children" under the intestate succession
laws and could therefore be entitled to share our property with our
other children or to receive all of our property if we have no other
children. 137
In addition to these warnings, client-patients are counseled that by execut-
ing wills that specifically disinherit their embryos they may limit some of
133. Id If a statute treated an in vitro embryo differently than an in utero embryo, the equal
protection clause compels a court to determine whether the classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary, and whether it rests upon some difference having a fair and substantial relationship to
the purpose of the legislation. Should frozen embryos come into being within a reasonable pe-
riod of time, perhaps 2 or 3 months after the intestates' death, a statute prohibiting inheritance
may be considered unreasonable, and denial of property could be a deprivation without due pro-
cess. Id.
134. Agreements between the AIOF and its client-patients specifically address the embryos
inheritance rights; Wisconsin statutes, at present, do not. See infra note 137 and accompanying
text.
135. See AIOF, supra note 120, at 9.
136. Wis. STAT. § 851.51 (1983). This section provides that the adopted child is to be treated
as the natural child of the adopted parents for the purposes of intestate succession, by, through,
and from the adopted person. Id.
137. See AIOF, CONSENT FORM FOR CRYOPRESERVATION, supra note 34, at 6.
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the risks otherwise present in inheritance. 3 ' As the drafters of the consent
form acknowledge, failure to execute wills may, nonetheless, leave the intes-
tate's estate vulnerable to challenge by after-born children.
Apart from whether or not probate administration would be unduly
burdened by permitting inheritance rights to thawed embryos, legislators
should consider whether the genetic parents have the right to devise or be-
queath their embryos.'39 Consent forms currently in use in Wisconsin deny
parents this right, in light of the clinic's overall policy to donate rather than
destroy frozen embryos.'"
Prior case law on point, although inconsistent, provides some guidance.
In 1973, a New York district court held in Del Zio v. Columbia Presbyterian
Medical Center,1 41 that the IVF embryo is not the property of the genetic
parents. The Del Zio's donated their sperm and ova, which was fertilized at
Columbia Presbyterian and subsequently was destroyed without the
couples' permission by Dr. Raymond Vande Wiele, the department chair-
man. Vande Wiele removed the embryo from its culture because he be-
lieved the procedure was too experimental to involve human embryos. The
Del Zio's sued, claiming infringement of property rights in the embryo and
infliction of emotional distress. The jury verdict awarded the couple dam-
ages for emotional distress but rejected the property claim. 142
By contrast, in a 1989 case, York v. Jones,4 3 the parents of frozen em-
bryos stored in a Virginia clinic requested their embryos be released to them
for transfer to a California clinic. Despite contrary contract provisions be-
tween the Yorks and the clinic, the court held that a bailment existed and
allowed the Yorks to remove their embryos from the Virginia clinic.'"
In the third case to consider the issue, Davis v. Davis,'45 the circuit
court held that frozen embryos were human life and not property. 46 The
138. Id.
139. See Andrews, supra note 21, at 394. Andrews observes that "[it is unlikely that the
embryo will be considered the property of the estate to be sold or distributed according to the
executor's plan-after all, the executor has no procreative right to the embryo." Instead, she
suggests that the fate of the embryos will depend upon prior private agreements made by its
progenitors. Id.
140. See Gunnarson, supra note 14.
141. No. 74 Civ. 3588, (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978).
142. Id.
143. No. 89-373-N (E.D. Va. July 11, 1989).
144. Id.
145. 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989).
146. Id.
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Davis case, subsequently reversed on appeal, may return to the court on yet
another appeal because the plaintiff was dissatisfied with the judgment.147
In another recent case, a California court held "that a person has a
property right to his or her genetic material, even if it is outside the
body." '148 In summary, any determination of what right of inheritance is
appropriate for a frozen embryo must consider what the legal status of the
embryo should be.
IV. REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: LAWS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Federal Law
Following the first successful birth by in vitro procedure (IVF), the Eth-
ical Advisory Board, under the direction of the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare (HEW), published a report on embryo research,
transplantation and in vitro procedures. 4 9 The Board determined that IVF
was an ethically sound procedure, though it made no specific recommenda-
tion for federal support of the research. However, the Board, did suggest
that model or uniform laws should be enacted to clarify the legal relations
of all parties involved.150
B. The Lifchez Decision
During the next twelve years, with no federal guidance forthcoming,
states began to enact their own laws which ranged from permissible labora-
tory uses of the IVF embryos 151 to mandatory health insurance coverage of
the IVF procedure. 52 The trend towards regulation is most visible in the
147. See Curriden, supra note 21, at 36. In an interview with Curriden, Kurt Erlenbach,
(Mary Sue's attorney) said his client has filed an application to appeal the decision to the Tennes-
see Supreme Court.
148. See Andrews, supra note 112, at 26.
149. See Robertson, supra note 18, at 952 n.46.
150. See Poole, supra note 42, at 81.
151. See Andrews, supra note 21, at 396-97. Andrews lists twenty-five states with fetal re-
search laws: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Wyo-
ming. Id. at 396-97 n.226.
152. Nine states have enacted some form of limited mandatory insurance coverage for IVF
procedures: Hawaii (1987), Massachusetts (1988), Texas (1988), Maryland (1985), Rhode Island
(1990), Arkansas (1987), California (1990), Connecticut (1989), New York (1991). Telephone
Interview with Barb Bruss, Insurance Coordinator for RESOLVE of Southern Wisconsin (Feb.
13, 1991) [hereinafter Bruss] (RESOLVE is a national, non-profit organization for support of
infertile couples).
The Hawaii insurance statute, HAW. REv. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (1987) provides: "All indi-
viduals and group health insurance policies which provide pregnancy-related benefits shall include
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area of embryonic research. Twenty-five states have passed fetal research
laws.'53 Although the constitutionality of most of these statutes has not yet
been tested, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently
struck down such an Illinois statute on two grounds:' 54 It violated Four-
teenth Amendment due process principles first because it was vague, and
second, because it infringed upon a woman's right of privacy and reproduc-
tive autonomy as established in Roe v. Wade.15 1
In Lifchez v. Hartigan, 1 6 the doctor who brought suit represented "a
class of plaintiff physicians who specialize in reproductive endocrinology
and fertility counselling."' 57 The plaintiff argued that the Illinois Legisla-
ture's failure to define "experimentation" and "therapeutic" forced physi-
cians to guess at whether their conduct was lawful. 5 Despite the
legislative attempt to preclude IVF procedure from the ambit of the statute,
the court accepted Dr. Lifchez's argument that there are sufficient variables
a physician may employ in the IVF procedure itself, all of which attempt to
further the objectives of the client, that render the procedure suspect under
the statute's then-present wording.'i 9
The Lifchez decision will impact on almost all state laws pertaining to
fetal research because most of them similarly prohibit nontherapeutic re-
search on fetuses, without providing any definition."6 A second result of
Lifchez reminds lawmakers that in order for laws to pass constitutional
in addition to any other benefits for treating infertility, a one-time only benefit for all outpatient
expenses arising from in vitro fertilization procedures performed on the insured or the insured's
dependent spouse." The statute qualifies the coverage by requiring that the fertilization occurs
with the patient spouse's sperm. It also requires that the patient has been unsuccessful in becom-
ing pregnant through other infertility treatments and that the procedure is performed in a clinic
which conforms to AFS guidelines. Id.
153. Andrews, supra note 21, at 396-97 n.226.
154. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir.
1990).
155. 410 U.S. 113 (1972), rehg denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973). The Illinois statute at issue in
Lifchez provided:
No person shall sell or experiment upon a fetus produced by the fertilization of a human
ovum by a human sperm unless such experimentation is therapeutic to the fetus thereby
produced. Intentional violation of the section is a Class A misdemeanor. Nothing in this
subsection (7) is intended to prohibit the performance of in vitro fertilization.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 para. 81-26, 6(7) (1989). Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1363.
156. Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. 1361.
157. Id. at 1363.
158. Id. at 1364.
159. Id. at 1368-69.
160. The Lifchez court provided Illinois with model statutes which could serve as a guide to
cure the vagueness in its own statute: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-9A-I(D) (Michie 1985); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-54-1(b) (Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01(3) (1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 112, § 125(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985). Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1375 n.7.
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muster, they may not protect IVF embryos by granting to them rights that
infringe upon the reproductive autonomy of couples seeking infertility
treatment. 161
C. Tort Law
In addition to laws restricting fetal research, those laws which create an
independent duty requiring the physician to care for the embryo may be
found constitutionally infirm as well.1 62 Under the tenets of Roe, the ge-
netic parents would have the exclusive right to implant, donate, or other-
wise dispose of their embryos. The right to dispose of one's genetic material
proceeds from the premise that the state has no compelling interest in the
conceptus before viability. 161
Another trend in laws pertaining to IVF reflects the continuing evolu-
tion of tort law. Recovery for prenatal injury, once limited to injury occur-
ring when the fetus was viable, has been extended by twelve states to
include any injury post conception.' 64 In these jurisdictions, a new tort
liability may attend physicians who negligently perform IVF procedures or
fail to fully inform the genetic parents of the reasonably foreseeable risks of
the procedure. In reaction to this trend, five states prohibit children from
bringing wrongful life suits against IVF clinics or the staff. 65 Those same
states also prohibit a genetically defective child from bringing suit against
his or her parents.66
D. Louisiana Law
State laws on IVF are usually found within the criminal code sections
on abortion, or within the civil code insurance section. By contrast, Louisi-
ana enacted a comprehensive law which includes thirteen subsections rang-
161. Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1376-77.
162. By way of example, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:127 (West 1986), entitled "Responsibil-
ity", provides: "Any physician or medical facility who causes in vitro fertilization of a human
ovum in vitro will be directly responsible for the in vitro safekeeping of the fertilized ovum." See
also Andrews, supra note 21, at 400.
163. See Poole, supra note 42, at 83-84.
164. Twelve states that allow recovery for prenatal injury at any time after conception are:
Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas. See Andrews, supra note 21, at 385.




ing from a working definition of "Human Embryo"' 167 to subsections on
ownership, inheritance, and destruction. 168
The Louisiana scheme, complete in scope, nonetheless suffers from sev-
eral constitutional flaws. Most notably, the law declares the IVF embryo to
be a juridical person which shall not be destroyed by any person once it has
existed for more than thirty-six hours.169 Granting legal personhood to
IVF embryos is not per se unconstitutional. However, a state should avoid
granting rights which arguably compete with the genetic parents' funda-
mental right of procreation. 170 The Louisiana law also purports to make
the clinic or physician responsible for the embryos' safety after it has caused
the embryos to come into being,17 1 which likewise may impinge on repro-
ductive autonomy.
The flaws in the Louisiana law should not dissuade other states from
adopting a comprehensive scheme which would ideally set forth a state pol-
icy addressing all the consequences of IVF. A state may find guidance in
case law such as Lifchez 172 and by analogy, in Roe and its progeny. 173 A
state may also look to the Louisiana model for scope and breadth, if not for
content.
To its credit, the Louisiana law does not simply address fetal research
but, in addition, seeks to clarify tangential issues of no less consequence:
custody,' 74 adoption, 175 and inheritance.176 Custody subsumed in a section
167. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (West 1986). This section provides a definition for
"Human Embryo", as "an in vitro fertilized human ovum, with certain rights granted by law,
composed of one or more living human cells and human genetic material so unified and organized
that it will develop in utero into an unborn child." Id.
168. LA. REv. STAT. §§ 9:126, 9:129, 9:133 (West 1986).
[sec. 126.] Ownership: An in vitro fertilized human is a biological human being which is
not the property of the physician.., or the facility .... [sec. 129.] Destruction: [That the
IVF] "human ovum is a juridical person which shall not be intentionally destroyed.... An
in vitro fertilized human ovum that fails to develop further over a thirty-six hour period
except when the embryo is in a state of cryopreservation, is considered non-viable and is
not considered a juridical person. [see. 133.] Inheritance Rights: Inheritance rights will
not flow to the in vitro fertilized ovum.., unless the... ovum develops into an unborn
child that is born in a live birth.
Id.
169. Id.
170. See Poole, supra note 42, at 74-75.
171. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:127 (West 1986). The section entitled "Responsibility" pro-
vides: "Any physician or medical facility who causes in vitro fertilization . . . will be directly
responsible for the in vitro safekeeping of the fertilized ovum." Id.
172. 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
173. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).




FERTILITY CLINICS MAKING LAW
entitled "Ownership", recognizes that the IVF embryo belongs to the ge-
netic parents in the first instance.17 7 If the embryos arise from an anony-
mous donation or the genetic parents fail to assert their parental rights, care
and custody of the embryos devolve to the clinic which performed the
procedure. 178
Implicit in this custody scenario is a high value placed on the potential
human life and the recognition that the embryo belongs to the genetic par-
ents. This subsection, standing apart from the chapter as a whole, clarifies
the role of the parents and the clinic with respect to the embryos, and is
careful to avoid infringing on any fundamental rights that would render it
otherwise vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
Adoption is addressed in the "Duties of Donors" subsection. 179 The law
allows the genetic parents to renounce their parental right to implantation.
Parents may select another couple to adopt the embryos subject to the ca-
veat that the other couple is "willing and able to receive the in vitro fertil-
ized ovum."1 0 The genetic parents may also renounce their rights in favor
of the clinic whereupon the embryos "shall be available for adoptive im-
plantation in accordance with written procedures of the facility." ' Under
this subsection, the fundamental rights of the genetic parents are observed,
while still providing for both independent and anonymous adoption
procedures.
Louisiana's custody and adoption provisions are affected by the "best
interest" standard imposed under subsection 131, entitled "Judicial Stan-
dard." ' 2 The "best interest" mandate in itself is not constitutionally im-
permissible, as long as it is applied to a situation in which the parent's
fundamental rights are duly protected at the outset. Applying the standard
to the custody and adoption provisions causes no constitutional problems.
The inheritance provision of the Louisiana law grants the IVF embryo
the contingent right to property upon live birth.18 3 The law also addresses
the consequences of adoption by terminating the adopted child's right to
inherit from his or her genetic parents.18 4 The presumptions and policies
underlying the law are not unusual. However, the law fails to address the
question whether a frozen embryo, thawed years after the testator's death,
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (West 1986).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:131 (West 1986).




could still inherit. 8 5 Facially, the law would permit the child to make a
claim at any future time.
In summary, the Louisiana effort is a credible attempt to define and
clarify the legal relations among the parties to IVF. It should be considered
by other states, in conjunction with case law, for the parameters of practica-
ble legislation.
V. FUTURE WISCONSIN LAW
The preceding background on IVF procedure and the accompanying
discussion of case law and statutory enactments of various jurisdictions ulti-
mately suggest that Wisconsin ought not to continue to permit its fertility
clinics and their clients to proceed without clarifying the legal relations of
all parties concerned.
Toward that end, Wisconsin should first recognize the competing inter-
ests that are at stake and the limitations on permissible legislation generated
by these interests. Paramount to any responsible legislation is recognition
of the genetic parents' fundamental right to reproductive autonomy." 6
Therefore, any attempt to clarify the status of the embryo must be limited
in scope. Laws restricting fetal research, as well as laws concerning the
disposal, destruction, or donation of embryos should be drafted in light of
constitutional limitations.187
Prospective legislation concerning in vitro procedure and fetal research
should avoid vague, ambiguous, and undefined terminology.181 In order for
lawmakers to make informed decisions, any bill on these subjects should be
drafted in consultation with experts. The state could appoint a special com-
mittee, comprised of personnel from the clinics presently operating in Wis-
consin. The committee's role would be to apprise lawmakers on the safety
and efficacy of the procedures they employ regularly, and to identify those
which are on the cutting edge of technology. In addition to adopting laws
designed to assure practitioners that their work is legally permissible, future
Wisconsin law must address the consequences of in vitro procedure on cus-
tody, adoption, and inheritance.
Custody law geared toward in vitro procedure must balance the genetic
parent's right to avoid unwanted parenthood with the right of the other
spouse to bear his or her own biological child. The safest course for Wis-
185. Id.
186. See Poole, supra note 42, at 74-75.
187. Id.
188. Future Wisconsin law may be guided by the suggested model statutes noted in the
Lifchez opinion. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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consin to take would be to recognize that, absent a pregnancy, the genetic
parents stand on an equal footing, and that joint legal custody is appropri-
ate. Under the unusual circumstance where the IVF embryo represents the
only opportunity for one parent to bear his or her own biological offspring,
sole legal custody to that parent may be in order. Under typical circum-
stances, however, the best interest standards would be applicable to custody
decisions on IVF children.'" 9 The law must be flexible enough to permit a
case by case review; hard and fast rules are not in any party's best interest.
The controlling consideration in current Wisconsin adoption law is the
welfare and best interests of the child.'90 These same considerations should
guide adoption procedures aimed at the in vitro embryos, with the caveat
that the genetic parents' fundamental right to procreate must be observed.
In addition, Wisconsin must consider to what extent it is permissible to
burden clinics with required procedure. Because the frozen embryos must
continue to be stored at an appropriate facility, the clinic is inexorably
linked to the adoption process. Procedures which are reasonable in relation
to the purpose of the legislation would be upheld. 9' The state might look
to the regulations it presently imposes on adoption facilities, and it might
modify or tailor those to suit the new situation. In addition, consultation
with a special committee may be the most appropriate means for assessing
which procedures a clinic might find burdensome.
In considering whether or not to update Wisconsin's posthumous heir
statute to encompass children who were once frozen embryos, lawmakers
are advised that the present statute could be construed to allow a claim
years after the testator's death.'92 This result could be avoided by adding to
the present law the qualification that the embryo be in utero at the time of
the testator's death in order for the later-born child to inherit.93 Limiting
the right to inherit to the period of gestation is consonant with a public
policy which favors expeditious probate. Alternatively, the state could ex-
pand the right to include a fixed period plus gestation, and use existing
guardian ad litem (GAL) statutes to protect the rights of the unborn. 94 If
this position were adopted, Wisconsin could empower its courts to impose a
trust on a certain portion of the estate for the benefit of the unborn, which
189. See Wis. STAT. § 767.24(5) (1987-88).
190. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
191. See Smith, supra notes 132, at 277.
192. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
193. Id.
194. Wis. STAT. § 701.15(2) (1984). This section provides: "The court may appoint a guard-
ian ad litem for any person interested who is legally incapacitated, unascertained or unborn ... "
This provision is found within the chapter on trusts.
1991]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
would pass by intestate succession after a specified, but reasonable, period
of time.
IVF and its companion, cryopreservation, will raise issues within the
areas of custody, adoption, and inheritance law, as well as many other areas
which were not the focus of this discussion. The Wisconsin Legislature has
yet to address in vitro procedure and its consequences. The present void is
neither beneficial to the participants of infertility programs nor to the
lawmakers who will inevitably be forced to deal with judge-made law if they
refuse to act.
VI. CONCLUSION
The premise underlying this Comment has been that the new reproduc-
tive technologies of IVF and cryopreservation will generate a variety of
legal issues which compel us to consider whether and to what extent present
law is sufficient for their resolution.
At first glance, the absence of laws appears to be the ultimate sanction
of procreative liberty. Yet, case law and statutory law persuade other-
wise.19 All participants stand to benefit from judiciously drafted laws
which adhere to permissible constitutional limitations. The clinic as well as
the client is more secure in exercising permissible options when the legal
framework is firmly in place. 196
Moreover, it is unreasonable to ignore the consequences of bringing life
into the world. No matter what status is ultimately accorded to the IVF
embryo, at a minimum, it represents potential human life. Much of the law
already recognizes the rights of the unborn in utero.1 97 IVF merely focuses
on an earlier point of the reproductive continuum. Society cannot ignore
the questions of who shall be responsible for this potential life, or who shall
provide his or her family, and the extent to which he or she is entitled to
property by, through, or from a biological or adoptive parent. The state's
role as parens patriae 198 compels it to consider those consequences, which
directly affect the well being of persons born to our community. Allowing
fertility clinics to continue to establish public policy is ultimately an abdica-
tion of a responsibility which should be born by the state.
DEBBIE K. LERNER
195. It is this author's opinion that Del Zio, York Lifchez, and Davis support the thesis that
legislation on point is necessary to avoid future litigation.
196. Id. This conclusion flows as a logical inference from the right to procreate.
197. See supra notes 128 and 164.
198. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 108.
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